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  5. Endogenous R& networks when labour unions have preferences over wages and employment
 
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Endogenous R& networks when labour unions have preferences over wages and employment

Publisher(s)
Scopus
Date Issued
2016
Author(s)
Rickman, N.
Vasileios Zikos
Other Contributor(s)
University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce. Research Support Office
Abstract
We develop a model to analyse the pattern of R& network formation when unions have relative preferences over wages and employment. Within a threefirm industry, weshow that when the unions place a low weight on wages and technological spillovers are low, a partial R& network that includes two firms but excludes the third emergesin equilibrium. In contrast, when the unions care a lot about wages, a complete R& network that includes all firms emerges. For all other intermediate levels of unionpreferences over wages, there is no strong stable equilibrium network. Empirical implications emerge from these findings, which are also discussed.
Subject(s)
Industrial Economics
Subjects
  • Innovation

  • Labour unions

  • R& collaboration

  • Wages

Access Rights
public
Rights
This work is protected by copyright. Reproduction or distribution of the work in any format is prohibited without written permission of the copyright owner.
Rights Holder(s)
University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce
Bibliographic Citation
N. Rickman, Vasileios Zikos (2016) Endogenous R& networks when labour unions have preferences over wages and employment. Economics of Innovation and New Technology Vol.25 No.1, 1-13.
File(s)
 04.pdf (153.97 KB)
Views
3
Acquisition Date
Mar 13, 2023
Downloads
1
Acquisition Date
Mar 13, 2023
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