Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Social conflict, growth and factor shares
Authors: Tsoukis, C. 
Tournemaine, F. 
Issue Date: 2011
Publisher: Scopus
University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce
Source: C. Tsoukis, F. Tournemaine (2011) Social conflict, growth and factor shares. Metroeconomica Vol.62 No.2, 283-304.
Abstract: Standard growth theory is based on atomistic agents with no strategic interactions among them. In contrast, we model growth as resulting from a oneoff, strategic game between 'workers' and owners of capital ('capitalists') on factor shares, in an otherwise standard 'AK' growth model. The resulting distribution of income between factors further determines the marginal revenueproduct of capital and the rate of growth. We analyse the properties of four equilibria: competitive, Stackelberg equilibrium, a hybrid noncooperative regime and cooperative, in terms of labour shares, growth and welfare. Our model thus endogenizes key aspects of the 'social contract'.
Rights: This work is protected by copyright. Reproduction or distribution of the work in any format is prohibited without written permission of the copyright owner.
Appears in Collections:RSO: Journal Articles

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
154.pdf139.21 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record Recommend this item

Page view(s)

checked on Jul 11, 2019


checked on Jul 11, 2019

Google ScholarTM


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.