Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Competing suppliers under price sensitive demand with a common retailer
Authors: Opornsawad, C. 
Srinon, R. 
Chaovalitwongs, W. 
Keywords: Bargaining power;Channels of distribution;Competition;Game theory;Oligopoly
Issue Date: 2013
Publisher: Scopus
University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce
Source: C. Opornsawad, R. Srinon, W. Chaovalitwongs (2013) Competing suppliers under price sensitive demand with a common retailer. Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science, 48-53.
Abstract: Pricing strategy is extremely important in commoditization. Commoditized products such as drinking water and generic pharmaceutical products are generally considered to be indifferent among manufacturers and can be easily substituted with similar products by competitors. Price is the only factor influencing consumers' decisions. The goal of this study is to investigate and present a price sensitive linear demand model that is more intuitive and interpretable with respect to the effects of competitor price and different bargaining power scenarios. In this model, a duopoly manufacturer and a common retailer are studied underthe Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg and Vertical Nash scenarios. The results of this study are compared with existing linear demand models in previous studies.
Rights: This work is protected by copyright. Reproduction or distribution of the work in any format is prohibited without written permission of the copyright owner.
Appears in Collections:RSO: Journal Articles

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
61.pdf117.03 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record Recommend this item

Page view(s)

checked on Jul 11, 2019

Google ScholarTM


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.