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Title: Endogenous R& networks when labour unions have preferences over wages and employment
Authors: Rickman, N. 
Zikos, Vasileios 
Keywords: Innovation;Labour unions;R& collaboration;Wages
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: Scopus
University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce
Source: N. Rickman, Vasileios Zikos (2016) Endogenous R& networks when labour unions have preferences over wages and employment. Economics of Innovation and New Technology Vol.25 No.1, 1-13.
Abstract: We develop a model to analyse the pattern of R& network formation when unions have relative preferences over wages and employment. Within a threefirm industry, weshow that when the unions place a low weight on wages and technological spillovers are low, a partial R& network that includes two firms but excludes the third emergesin equilibrium. In contrast, when the unions care a lot about wages, a complete R& network that includes all firms emerges. For all other intermediate levels of unionpreferences over wages, there is no strong stable equilibrium network. Empirical implications emerge from these findings, which are also discussed.
Rights: This work is protected by copyright. Reproduction or distribution of the work in any format is prohibited without written permission of the copyright owner.
Appears in Collections:RSO: Journal Articles

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